Who is reynolds v sims

The complaint alleged serious discrimination against voters in counties whose populations had grown proportionately far more than others since the census which, despite Alabama's constitutional requirements for legislative representation based on population and for decennial reapportionment, formed the basis for the existing legislative apportionment.

The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, which held that the existing and two legislatively proposed plans for the apportionment of seats in the two houses of the Alabama legislature were invalid. Jump to: navigation , search. Reynolds v. Sims was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in The case was brought by a group of Alabama voters who alleged that the apportionment of Alabama's state legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution.

At the time, the Alabama Constitution required that each county have at least one representative and that there be as many senators as there were senatorial districts; these conditions created population variations between state legislative districts. On June 15, , the high court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the United States Constitution requires "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens.

The case: The plaintiffs in the case alleged that the apportionment of Alabama's state legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The issue: "Did Alabama's apportionment scheme violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial districts as there were senators, regardless of population variances?

The outcome: The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that legislative districts within a state must have substantially equal populations. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source. Categories : Redistricting lawsuits Redistricting tracking Election policy tracking. Hidden category: Election policy expansion content. Voter information What's on my ballot?

Where do I vote? How do I register to vote? How do I request a ballot? But whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens. In the House, Thaddeus Stevens introduced debate on the resolution on May 8.

In his opening remarks, Stevens explained why he supported the resolution although it fell "far short" of his wishes:. Not only Congress, but the several States, are to be consulted. Upon a careful survey of the whole ground, we did not believe that nineteen of the loyal States could be induced to ratify any proposition more stringent than this. He then explained the impact of the first section of the proposed Amendment, particularly the Equal Protection Clause.

Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree. Whatever law protects the white man shall afford 'equal' protection to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in court shall allow the man of color to do the same. These are great advantages over their present codes. Now, different degrees of punishment are inflicted not on account of the magnitude of the crime, but according to the color of the skin.

Now color disqualifies a man from testifying in courts, or being tried in the same way as white men. I need not enumerate these partial and oppressive laws. Unless the Constitution should restrain them, those States will all, I fear, keep up this discrimination and crush to death the hated freedmen. He turned next to the second section, which he said he considered "the most important in the article.

The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States to grant universal suffrage or so to shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the national Government, both legislative and executive.

Closing his discussion of the second section, he noted his dislike for the fact that it allowed "the States to discriminate [with respect to the right to vote] among the same class, and receive proportionate credit in representation.

Toward the end of the debate three days later, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amendment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it. No State ever had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without remedy.

The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States. Bingham said, supra, "the second section excludes the conclusion that, by the first section, suffrage is subjected to congressional law.

Much of the debate concerned the change in the basis of representation effected by the second section, and the speakers stated repeatedly, in express terms or by unmistakable implication, that the States retained the power to regulate suffrage within their borders. Attached as U. The resolution was adopted by the House without change on May Debate in the Senate began on May 23, and followed the same pattern.

Speaking for the Senate Chairman of the Reconstruction Committee, who was ill, Senator Howard, also a member of the Committee, explained the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as follows:. This abolishes all class legislation in the States, and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another. It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws over the white man.

Is it not time, Mr. President, that we extend to the black man, I had almost called it the poor privilege of the equal protection of the law? The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a depostism [ sic ].

Discussing the second section, he expressed his regret that it did "not recognize the authority of the United States over the question of suffrage in the several States. We may as well state it plainly and fairly, so that there shall be no misunderstanding on the subject. It was our opinion that three-fourths of the States of this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, even in any degree or under any restriction, to the colored race. There was not in the Senate, as there had been in the House, a closing speech in explanation of the Amendment.

But because the Senate considered, and finally adopted, several changes in the first and second sections, even more attention was given to the problem of voting rights there than had been given in the House.

In the. Senate, it was fully understood by everyone that neither the first nor the second section interfered with the right of the States to regulate the elective franchise. After having changed the proposed amendment to the form in which it was adopted, the Senate passed the resolution on June 8, Of the 23 loyal States which ratified the Amendment before , five had constitutional provisions for apportionment of at least one house of their respective legislatures which wholly disregarded the spread of population.

Ten more had constitutional provisions which gave primary emphasis to population, but which applied also other principles, such as partial ratios and recognition of political subdivisions, which were intended to favor sparsely settled areas.

Nor were these state constitutional provisions merely theoretical. In New Jersey, for example, Cape May County, with a population of 8,, and Ocean County, with a population of 13,, each elected one State Senator, as did Essex and Hudson Counties, with populations of , and ,, respectively.

New York, each of the 60 counties except Hamilton County was entitled to one of the seats in the Assembly. In Vermont, after each county had been allocated one Senator, there were 16 seats remaining to be distributed among the larger counties.

Objecting to the inclusion of Florida in the Act of June 25, , Mr. Farnsworth stated on the floor of the House:. By this constitution, representatives in the Legislature of Florida are apportioned in such a manner as to give to the sparsely populated portions of the State the control of the Legislature.

The sparsely populated parts of the State are those where there are very few negroes, the parts inhabited by the white rebels, the men who, coming in from Georgia, Alabama, and other States, control the fortunes of their several counties. By this constitution, every county in that State is entitled to a representative.

There are in that State counties that have not thirty registered voters; yet, under this constitution, every one of those counties is entitled. This constitution has been submitted to the Senate, and they have found it republican and proper. It has been submitted to your own Committee on Reconstruction, and they have found it republican and proper, and have reported it to this House.

The Constitutions of six of the 10 States contained provisions departing substantially from the method of apportionment now held to be required by the Amendment. In North Carolina, 90 of the representatives were apportioned among the counties without regard to population, leaving 30 seats to be distributed by numbers.

It is incredible that Congress would have exacted ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as the price of readmission, would have studied the State Constitutions for compliance with the Amendment, and would then have disregarded violations of it. Even if one were to accept the majority's belief that it is proper entirely to disregard the unmistakable implications. There is here none of the difficulty which may attend the application of basic principles to situations not contemplated or understood when the principles were framed.

The problems which concern the Court now were problems when the Amendment was adopted. By the deliberate choice of those responsible for the Amendment, it left those problems untouched.

The years following , far from indicating a developing awareness of the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to problems of apportionment, demonstrate precisely the reverse: that the States retained and exercised the power independently to apportion their legislatures. In its Constitutions of and , Alabama carried forward earlier provisions guaranteeing each county at least one representative and fixing an upper limit to the number of seats in the House. In , New York adopted a Constitution the peculiar apportionment provisions of which were obviously intended to prevent representation according to population: no county was allowed to have more than one-third of all the Senators, no two counties which were adjoining or "separated only by public waters" could have more than one-half of all the Senators, and whenever any county became entitled to more than three Senators, the total number of Senators was increased, thus preserving to the small counties their original number of seats.

Since the Court now invalidates the legislative apportionments in six States, and has so far upheld the apportionment in none, it is scarcely necessary to comment on the situation in the States today, which is, of course, as fully contrary to the Court's decision as is the record of every prior period in this Nation's history.

Tennessee, which was the subject of Baker v. Carr, and Virginia, scrutinized and disapproved today in No. In this summary of what the majority ignores, note should be taken of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. The former prohibited the States from denying or abridging the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. In Minor v. Happersett , 21 Wall.

The Court's discussion there of the significance of the Fifteenth Amendment is fully applicable here with respect to the Nineteenth Amendment as well. Nothing is more evident than that the greater must. In the present case, we can go still further. If constitutional amendment was the only means by which all men and, later, women, could be guaranteed the right to vote at all, even for federal officers, how can it be that the far less obvious right to a particular kind of apportionment of state legislatures -- a right to which is opposed a far more plausible conflicting interest of the State than the interest which opposes the general right to vote -- can be conferred by judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Mention should be made finally of the decisions of this Court which are disregarded or, more accurately, silently overruled today. Minor v. Happersett, supra, in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not. Other cases are more directly in point. In Colegrove v. Barrett, U. Smith, F.

The District Court stated that it was aware that the plaintiffs' allegations were "notoriously true" and that. This Court dismissed the appeal "for the want of a substantial federal question. In Kidd v. McCanless, Tenn. The complaint alleged that. Without dissent, this Court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal. In Radford v. Gary, F. The complaint recited the unwillingness or inability of the branches of the state government to provide relief, and alleged that there was no state remedy available.

The District Court granted a motion to dismiss. This Court affirmed without dissent. Each of these recent cases is distinguished on some ground or other in Baker v. Their summary dispositions prevent consideration whether these after-the-fact distinctions are real or imaginary.

The fact remains, however, that, between and , four cases raising issues precisely the same as those decided today were presented to the Court. Three were dismissed because the issues presented were thought insubstantial, and, in the fourth, the lower court's dismissal was affirmed.

I have tried to make the catalogue complete, yet to keep it within the manageable limits of a judicial opinion.

In my judgment, today's decisions are refuted by. They are unequivocally refuted by history and by consistent theory and practice from the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment until today. The Court's elaboration of its new "constitutional" doctrine indicates how far -- and how unwisely -- it has strayed from the appropriate bounds of its authority. The consequence of today's decision is that, in all but the handful of States which may already satisfy the new requirements, the local District Court or, it may be, the state courts, are given blanket authority and the constitutional duty to supervise apportionment of the State Legislatures.

It is difficult to imagine a more intolerable and inappropriate interference by the judiciary with the independent legislatures of the States. In the Alabama cases Nos. See ante, pp. The District Court formulated its own plan for the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature by picking and choosing among the provisions of the legislative measures.

See ante, p. Beyond that, the court warned the legislature that there would be still further judicial reapportionment unless the legislature, like it or not, undertook the task for itself. This Court now states that the District Court acted in "a most proper and commendable manner," ante, p. In the Maryland case No. Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Maryland Senate was constitutionally apportioned.

Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, Md. This Court now holds that neither branch of the State Legislature meets constitutional requirements. Post, p. The Court presumes that, since. On this premise, the Court concludes that the Maryland courts need not "feel obliged to take further affirmative action" now, but that.

In the Virginia case No. Mann v. Davis, F. The District Court gave the State Legislature two months within which to reapportion itself in special session, under penalty of being reapportioned by the court. The Virginia Legislature is to be given "an adequate opportunity to enact a valid plan," but if it fails "to act promptly in remedying the constitutional defects in the State's legislative apportionment plan," the District Court is to "take further action.

In Delaware No. Sincock v. Terry, F. By way of prodding, presumably, the court noted that, if no legislative action were taken and the court sustained the plaintiffs' claim,. Five days later, on July 30, , the General Assembly approved a proposed amendment to the State Constitution. On August 7, , the District Court entered an order denying the.

The court said that it did not wish to substitute its judgment "for the collective wisdom of the General Assembly of Delaware," but that, "in the light of all the circumstances," it had to proceed promptly. On October 16, , the court declined to enjoin the conduct of elections in November. The court went on to express its regret that the General Assembly had not adopted the court's suggestion, see F.

In January, , the General Assembly again approved the proposed amendment of the apportionment provisions of the Delaware Constitution, which thereby became effective on January 17, Duffy, F. Observing that "the State of Delaware, the General Assembly, and this court all seem to be trapped in a kind of box of time," id.

On May 20, , the District Court enjoined the defendants from conducting any elections, including the general election scheduled for November, , pursuant to the old or the new constitutional provisions.

Records such as these in the cases decided today are sure to be duplicated in most of the other States if they have not been already. They present a jarring picture of courts threatening to take action in an area which they have no business entering, inevitably on the basis of political judgments which they are incompetent to make.

They show legislatures of the States meeting in haste and deliberating and deciding in haste to avoid the threat of judicial interference. So far as I can tell, the Court's only response to this unseemly state of affairs is ponderous insistence that "a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection," ante, p.

By thus refusing to recognize the bearing which a potential for. It should by now be obvious that these cases do not mark the end of reapportionment problems in the courts. Predictions once made that the courts would never have to face the problem of actually working out an apportionment have proved false.

This Court, however, continues to avoid the consequences of its decisions, simply assuring us that the lower courts "can and. Deeming it "expedient" not to spell out "precise constitutional tests," the Court contents itself with stating "only a few rather general considerations. Generalities cannot obscure the cold truth that cases of this type are not amenable to the development of judicial standards. No set of standards can guide a court which has to decide how many legislative districts a State shall have, or what the shape of the districts shall be, or where to draw a particular district line.

No judicially manageable standard can determine whether a State should have single member districts or multi-member districts or some combination of both.

No such standard can control the balance between keeping up with population shifts and having stable districts. In all these respects, the courts will be called upon to make particular decisions with respect to which a principle of equally populated districts will be of no assistance whatsoever. Quite obviously, there are limitless possibilities for districting consistent with such a principle.

Nor can these problems be avoided by judicial reliance on legislative judgments so far as possible. Reshaping or combining one or two districts, or modifying just a few district lines, is no less a matter of choosing among many possible.

The Court ignores all this, saying only that "what is marginally permissible in one State may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular circumstances of the case," ante, p. It is well to remember that the product of today's decisions will not be readjustment of a few districts in a few States which most glaringly depart from the principle of equally populated districts.

It will be a redetermination, extensive in many cases, of legislative districts in all but a few States. Although the Court -- necessarily, as I believe -- provides only generalities in elaboration of its main thesis, its opinion nevertheless fully demonstrates how far removed these problems are from fields of judicial competence. Recognizing that "indiscriminate districting" is an invitation to "partisan gerrymandering," ante pp.

So far as presently appears, the only factor which a State may consider, apart from numbers, is political subdivisions. But even "a clearly rational state policy" recognizing this factor is unconstitutional if "population is submerged as the controlling consideration. I know of no principle of logic or practical or theoretical politics, still less any constitutional principle, which establishes all or any of these exclusions. Certain it is that the Court's opinion does not establish them.

So far as the Court says anything at all on this score, it says only that "legislators represent people, not trees or acres," ante, p. But it is surely equally obvious, and, in the context of elections, more meaningful, to note that people are not ciphers, and that legislators can represent their electors only by speaking.

The Court does not establish, or indeed even attempt to make a case for the proposition that conflicting interests within a State can only be adjusted by disregarding them when voters are grouped for purposes of representation. With these cases, the Court approaches the end of the third round set in motion by the complaint filed in Baker v.

What is done today deepens my conviction that judicial entry into this realm is profoundly ill-advised and constitutionally impermissible. As I have said before, Wesberry v. Speech on the Marshall Plan. Speech on the Truman Doctrine. Excerpts from Sources of Soviet Conduct. Excerpts from The Cold War. Speech on the North Atlantic Treaty. Speech Explaining the Communist Threat. The Long Telegram. Letter to James Byrnes. Telegram Regarding American Postwar Behavior.

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